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Abstract 
The study of translation can shed crucial light on the extent to which thoughts that are first 
organized in one language can be successfully transferred through another, and thus on the 
nature and extent of language differences. Language requires that thoughts be selected, 
categorized, oriented, and combined, and each language places its own constraints on these 
processes, which are illustrated here with attempts to translate from the Native American 
language Seneca into English. 
 
1 Introduction 
If one believes, as I do, that different languages organize thoughts in different ways, one cannot 
help wondering how it is possible for the thoughts that are expressed in one language to be 
expressed equally well in another language. And yet we find people translating from one 
language to another all the time, apparently with considerable success. There seems, then, to be a 
translation paradox. 
 This paradox would not be recognized by everyone. Ray Jackendoff, for example, wrote that 
“pretty much anything we can say in one language can be translated into any other, preserving 
the thought that the original language conveys” (Jackendoff 1994: 185). Quite different is the 
view expressed by Dan Slobin: “The language or languages that we learn in childhood are not 
neutral coding systems of an objective reality. Rather, each one is a subjective orientation to the 
world of human experience, and this orientation affects the ways in which we think while we are 
speaking” (Slobin 1996: 91). It would seem that for Jackendoff there is no translation paradox, 
whereas for Slobin the paradox is real. Is there any way to resolve these opposing views? 
 To begin with, it would be a mistake to take the extreme position that the differences 
between languages are so great that they make translation absolutely impossible, or to think, at 
the opposite extreme, that they are so trivial that there is no problem at all. The question should 
be the extent to which translation is possible. It is an important question, not only for practical 
reasons, but because it forces one to confront the basic nature of language. There may in fact be 
no question in the study of language that highlights more directly the need to understand what 
language is, how languages differ, and how much of language is universal. 
 Language is a way of associating thoughts with sounds (see Chafe 2002 for an elaboration of 
the remarks that follow). Languages are the way they are because it is obviously impossible for 
every unique thought to be associated with a unique sound. Before languages can do anything 
with them, it is necessary for thoughts be organized, and of course for sounds be organized as 
well. No one would deny that different languages organize sounds in different ways, and one 
might expect prima facie that different languages would organize thoughts differently as well. 
Thoughts are more elusive, more difficult to understand “scientifically” than sounds, and for that 
reason any investigation of them is bound to be more controversial. But to understand the 
problems associated with translation there is no way to avoid confronting the nature of thoughts, 
and what languages do with them.  
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 Introspection suggests that thoughts have at least three distinguishable components that are 
accessible to consciousness. First, there are perceptual experiences that provide our most 
immediate contact with reality, even though they may include a significant amount of 
interpretation of that reality. Perceptual experiences may be immediate, or they may arise 
through remembering and imagining, in which case they acquire the degraded form known as 
mental imagery. Second, we also experience emotions and attitudes that may accompany and be 
stimulated by our perceptual experiences, or may arise internally. I will refer to them as 
evaluative experiences. These two components of thought, perception and evaluation, can be at 
least partly independent of language. But a third component is inner language itself, which 
organizes both perceptual and evaluative experiences in accordance with the organizational 
principles of some language. A great deal of thought has this verbal quality. The basic 
components of thought, then, to the extent that we are conscious of them, include experiences 
that are perceptual, evaluative, and verbal, typically interwoven with each other. 
 One way of organizing experience, whether any linguistic organization has been applied to it 
or not, is its organization into what I will call ideas: ideas of events and states, accompanied by 
ideas of the persons and objects that participate in them. These ideas, furthermore, are located 
within a multidimensional universe of time, space, epistemology, society, and the relations that 
ideas bear to each other. This organization of thoughts into ideas and their orientation is probably 
universal and independent of whatever language one may speak. 
 But thoughts, even though they are organized in this way, cannot simply be plugged into 
language without further adjustments. At least four major kinds of adjustment appear to be 
necessary. First, thoughts are always more extensive and complex than anything a language can 
express, so they must first be reduced to something manageable. To turn thoughts into words, 
speakers must first select the thoughts that they wish to express. Second, since each idea is likely 
to be a unique experience, it must be categorized in a way that will allow it to be treated by 
language in the same way as other experiences that might be categorized in the same way. Ideas 
must be interpreted as instances of categories. Third, since ideas can be oriented in many 
different ways and no language is able to give expression to all those ways, speakers must 
choose among possible orientations. Ideas have to be placed in time, space, epistemology, social 
interaction, and with relation to other ideas in ways that are favored by the particular language. 
Fourth and finally, since ideas and their orientations never occur in isolation from other ideas and 
orientations, speakers must decide on ways of combining them. Ideas and orientations must be 
joined together in some way. These four processes are summarized in figure 1. Each language 
provides its own resources and its own preferences for each of these processes, and no two 
languages handle them identically. In this sense every language dictates what may be called its 
own semantic structuring, and it may differ more or less from language to language. 
 
Figure 1: Processes by which thoughts must be adjusted to language 
 
Selection 
Categorization 
Orientation 
Combination 
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I will exemplify these processes here from my own attempts to translate from the Native 
American language Seneca into English. Seneca is one of the so-called Northern Iroquoian 
languages, currently spoken by only about a hundred people in western New York State. My 
work has brought home to me the possibilities and problems that arise in translating from this 
language. Seneca is radically different from English, and attempts to translate between the two 
can show especially well the kinds of difficulties that can arise. 
 It would be possible to choose examples in which translation is hindered by the fact that 
some Seneca ideas are difficult to express in English simply because English speakers have 
never needed to express them. There are, for example, objects and events in Seneca culture that 
are absent from the the mainstream culture of English speakers. In a sense such problems are 
trivial, because they can be overcome by borrowing or inventing new English words. The 
examples here are not of that sort, but involve ideas that could potentially be shared by speakers 
of both languages. Such examples can be more interesting, since they draw attention to more 
pervasive differences that can exist without regard to whatever subject matter is being talked 
about. 
 
2 A brief example 
Each of the four processes listed in figure 1 can be illustrated very briefly with the sentence in 
(1), which was uttered by a Seneca speaker as she began to tell a folktale. A free translation is 
shown on the right. (For more on this particular story, see Chafe 1998. Here I am using the 
symbols “ô” and “ê” for nasalized vowels. The apostrophe indicates a glottal stop, and the 
accents show a heightened pitch.) 
 
(1) Né:’ gyô’ô nónêhji wáónôhgwáge:eya’s. Long ago there was a man whose wife died. 
 
I believe that the thought conveyed by the translation corresponds reasonably well to what the 
speaker was thinking. But “reasonably well” is a hedge, and we can now examine several 
reasons why such a hedge is necessary. 
 
2.1 Selection 
The speaker chose to begin her story by verbalizing the idea of an event. It was an event that 
formed the background of a plot in which the man in question married again, and a conflict then 
arose between his second wife and his daughter by his first wife. One noticeable difference 
between what the speaker said and the English translation is the fact that she did not separately 
introduce the man. The Seneca lacked anything that would correspond to the English phrase 
“there was a man”. Although the last word in (1) can be translated as “his wife died”, there was 
no further specification of who he was. 
 According to the Seneca way of organizing thoughts there is a tendency to focus more on 
events and states as global entities, with less attention to characterizing separately the 
participants within them. It is only a tendency, but differences of this kind can make something 
“sound like a translation” unless adjustments are made. To add in the English “there was a man”, 
as I did in (1), provides little additional information, but it accords better with English rhetorical 
practices. One might object that differences of this kind are cultural rather than linguistic, not 
differences between the two languages as such. Such differences, nevertheless, do influence the 
shape that language takes, and they raise the question of whether, at a certain level of discourse, 
the boundary between culture and language becomes obscure. 
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2.2 Categorization 
The idea that was verbalized in (1) was categorized in Seneca as an event in which someone was 
affected adversely by the death of a spouse. The -’s suffix at the end of the last word in (1) 
functions as a so-called applicative, adding a participant to the simpler, intransitive idea of the 
spouse dying, with this added participant being someone who was adversely affected by the 
event. A more colloquial, although perhaps stylistically less appropriate translation might be 
“there was a man whose spouse died on him”. The idea of a spouse dying can be categorized 
adequately in each language, but the further resources Seneca makes available for that purpose 
have no wholly satisfactory English equivalent. 
 
2.3 Orientation 
Events may be oriented with verbal affixes or with separate adverbs and particles. The first word 
in (1), the particle ne:’, has no English equivalent. It means something like “it is the case that”, 
indicating that what follows is being asserted. Its use is determined by Seneca discourse patterns, 
and in English it is usually best left untranslated. The second word, gyô’ô, shows that the speaker 
did not observe this event directly, that she heard about it from someone else. It is used widely in 
Seneca for all kinds of secondhand knowledge, but is especially common in stories. It would be 
possible to extend the translation to read “long ago, it is said, there was a man whose wife died”. 
But although “it is said” might be acceptable at the beginning of a story in English, to repeat it 
each of the 62 times it appeared in the Seneca story would be less than felicitous. 
 The third word in (1), the adverb nónêhji, can be translated “long ago”, although the manner 
in which this word activates an ancient oral tradition and its associated emotions is lost. In 
today’s English-speaking community, use of the roughly corresponding phrase “once upon a 
time” would seem quaint, but nónêhji is a familiar way of orienting a Seneca listener to an entire 
world of familiar, if imaginary events. 
 There is nothing in Seneca that corresponds to the past tense included in the English word 
“died”. The fact that this event took place at an earlier time was surely present in the speaker’s 
thoughts, and we have seen how it was established by the adverb nónêhji. But Seneca has no 
obligatory requirement, as English does, for pastness to be expressed on every verb. This is a 
good example of how different languages force thoughts to be oriented differently, even when 
the ideas themselves may agree. So far as translation is concerned, the past tense in English does 
no violence to Seneca’s expression, even though it fails to correspond to anything overtly 
expressed. 
 The prefix wa- in the last word of (1) orients this event in accordance with one of three 
options for placing events on a scale of reality, ranging from “factual” through “predicted” to 
“hypothesized”. These three options are roughly captured in English by “she died”, “she will 
die”, or “she might die”, and it was the implied factuality of the first that was chosen here. Its 
factuality was judged, of course, within the imagined folktale world, not with relation to the 
actual world inhabited by the speaker as she told the story. 
 
2.4 Combination 
We come finally to the fourth way in which thoughts must be adjusted to a particular language: 
the resources made available for combining them. We can note, first of all, a preferred Seneca 
pattern by which ideas are first given various orientations by means of adverbs and particles 
before the ideas of the events and states and their participants are themselves verbalized. Thus, in 
 61 
(1) there were the orientations of assertion (ne:’), secondhand information (gyô’ô), and mythical 
time (nónêhji) before the idea of the dying itself was expressed. The translation, with the words 
“long ago” at the beginning, accounted for one of these orientations but not the other two. With a 
longer passage the rhetorical effect of accumulated orientations at the beginning of a statement 
would be more evident. 
 It is especially relevant that Seneca is a polysynthetic language, and as such it usually 
includes more information within a verb than English does. The last word in (1) includes not 
only the idea of the dying, but also the idea that the person who died was a spouse, as well as the 
fact that this event adversely affected a single male individual, not to mention the factual 
orientation. These ideas and orientations are associated with segments of sound in the manner 
shown in figure 2. 
Figure 2 
wá  ó  nôhgwá ge:eya ’s 
factual single spouse die adversative 
 male    
 [ affected ]    
 
It is of some interest that this language packages within a single word not only the categorization 
of an event (spouse-dying), but also a reference to one or more of the participants in it. 
Regardless of the language one speaks, it is impossible to think of events without simultaneously 
thinking of their participants, and Seneca combines both within a single word, whereas English 
separates them. There may in fact be a relation between this strategy of integrating events and 
their participants morphologically and the tendency not to present a participant in a separate 
introduction, as discussed above. 
 Seneca grammar thus combines ideas and their orientations in ways that are markedly 
different from the dictates of English grammar. Nevertheless, such differences may not in 
themselves be a serious impediment to translation. It may in fact be the possibility of 
translatability across grammars that led Jackendoff to the view quoted above. If Seneca 
expresses the idea of some event, say, with the single complex word wa’áie’ and English 
expresses a similar idea with the two simpler words “she died”, the thoughts themselves are not 
radically different. It may be that the greatest difficulties for translation lie in differences in 
categorization and orientation. 
 
3 A longer example 
One brief sentence like that in (1) can scarcely provide enough data for any general conclusions. 
There is not enough space here to examine a large collection of data, but we can at least look at a 
slightly more extended example. The following is an excerpt from some remarks that were made 
with regard to a local political situation. For peculiar historical reasons, the city of Salamanca, 
New York, is located entirely within the Allegheny Seneca Reservation. Since the nineteenth 
century white property owners in Salamanca had been paying to lease their land from the 
Senecas, but the amounts were small and sometimes nonexistent. The leases expired toward the 
end of the twentieth century, and the Senecas negotiated to enforce considerably larger 
payments. Understandably, these negotiations aroused strong emotions on both sides. The 
speaker summarized his own views as shown in (3). The English on the right expresses his 
thoughts more or less adequately. But what are the implications of “more or less”? 
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(3) The Salamanca Lease Controversy 
 
(a) Da: ne:’ nô: hê:né:h,    And I guess they thought 
(b) êyágwatgá’ negê’ ne yôêdzá’,   we would give up the land, 
(c) ôgyôêdza:dé’ ne’hoh,    our land, 
(d) næ: da’áô ne’hó nô:yawêh.   but it was impossible for that to happen. 
(e) Da: ne:’ gáíô:ní nê:gê: hodínô’kwê’ôh.  And that was the reason they got mad. 
(f) Næ: da:digwe:gôh,    Not all of them, 
(g) ne:’ shô: neh,     just 
(h) ne:’ ne da:diyêde:íh.    those that didn’t understand. 
(i) Nô: gaya:sô neh,     I guess you could say 
(j) honôhsigwé:ót ne’hoh.    they were stirring up trouble there. 
(k) Da: negê’ nô: næ:h,    And I guess 
(l) êgáiwíyoak nô: ne ae’ wêdôshô’ôh.  things will settle down eventually. 
(m) Næ: ní:’ a:yê:’ sô:gá:’ dé:gê’se neh,  As for me I don’t think less of anyone 
(n) hadinôge:nyô’ ne hadí:nyô’ôh.   among the white people that live there. 
(o) Ôgwádéó’shô’ honôtga’de’.   A lot of them are my friends. 
 
3.1 Selection 
So far as this speaker’s choices of what to verbalize are concerned, there may be little here that is 
peculiarly Seneca. Although such differences are subtle and easy to overlook, it would seem that 
the thoughts the speaker chose to express here reflect his reactions as an individual, and were not 
significantly influenced by either his language or his culture. 
 
3.2 Categorization 
The passage categorizes several ideas in ways that are not easily reproduced in English. One 
example is to be found in line (b), where English provides no exact parallel for the root of the 
verb êyágwatga’. I translated it “give (something) up”, but in other contexts the same root might 
be translated “supply” or “provide”. In religious contexts it is used to refer to God’s actions in 
providing the essentials for life on earth, and certainly “give up” would not be appropriate there. 
The fundamental notion is one of making available something that will benefit the recipient. 
Because of the context in (3) this action would involve the Senecas “giving up” their land, but 
the word the speaker used does not in itself have the same connotation of being victimized. 
 Line (l) might be more literally translated as “the matter will continue to be good again 
sometimes”. With the word êgáiwíyoak the speaker was predicting a future state in which good 
feelings would prevail, and the -k at the end of this word indicated that this state would continue. 
The idea conveyed in English by “things will settle down eventually” is thus only an 
approximation to what the speaker was thinking. 
 The most problematic item in this passage is found in lines (i) and (j). The word 
honôhsigwe:ot at the beginning of (j) can be translated literally as “they are standing up a fork in 
it”, a Seneca idiom used to express an idea that is similar to the English “they are stirring up 
trouble”, which employs another and quite different idiom. By definition, idioms involve two 
distinct ideas, in the Seneca case the idea of sticking a fork in something (the literal meaning) 
and the idea of causing trouble (the idiomatic meaning). This speaker’s thought was focused on 
the idea of causing trouble, but his use of the idiom simultaneously activated what I have called a 
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“shadow meaning”, the idea of sticking a fork in something. In English the idiomatic meaning 
conveyed by “stirring up trouble” comes close to what the speaker had in mind, but the shadow 
meaning of stirring something is of course quite different. Although their idiomatic meanings 
may be similar, the literal meanings of idioms in separate languages are often very different, as 
here. The idiomatic meanings of the “sticking a fork” idiom and the “stirring” idiom allow the 
translation to succeed up to a point, but only as long as their shadow meanings are ignored. 
  That brings us to line (i), in which the word gaya:sôh means literally “it is called”. For the 
speaker, (i) was a metalinguistic comment on what he was about to say in (j). He was saying that 
the idea he was about to express could be captured with the “sticking a fork” idiom. My 
translation “I guess you could say” is inaccurate in suggesting that the speaker was hedging his 
evaluation of the situation, whereas in fact he was hedging his choice of a way to categorize it. 
 The categorization expressed in the word dé:gê’se in line (m) presents another problem. The 
verb root -gê- in the middle of this word can be translated with the English word “see”. Here, 
however, it is followed by the same applicative marker -’s that we met at the end of the word 
wáónôhgwáge:eya’s in (1), where it showed that the spouse’s death had adversely affected her 
husband. In dé:gê’se it indicates that seeing something adversely affected another person. The 
de- at the beginning of this word is a negative prefix, and thus the literal meaning is 
approximately “I don’t see it in a way that adversely affects him”. The translation “I don’t think 
less of him” approaches a similar idea from a very different angle. 
 
3.3 Orientation 
We can observe in (3), as in (1), the absence of any past tense marking. In this case, however, 
there was no word like ónêhji to orient the ideas to the past, and as a result the entire passage, as 
it stands, is ambiguous with respect to its temporal orientation. The speaker could just as well be 
describing a current situation, and it is only the larger context, including knowledge of when the 
lease controversy took place, that would lead a listener to interpret the passage as describing 
something from the past. Without such knowledge I could equally well have begun the 
translation with “And I guess they think we will give up the land”, etc. But language is always 
created in a context, and the absence of past tense marking, although it is potentially ambiguous 
in isolated examples, is seldom so in practice. 
 The particle næ: or næ:h occurs in lines (d), (f), (k), and (m), and like various other Seneca 
particles it is difficult to translate directly. This one emphasizes or highlights some idea, and it is 
a good example of an orientation that is expressed with a particle in one language and prosody in 
another. It is best translated by raising the pitch on the target word in English, as follows: 
 
d but it was impossible for that to happen 
f not all of them 
k and I guess 
m I don’t believe I think less of anybody 
 
In line (m) the force of the Seneca words næ: ni:’ might however be captured more accurately 
with the translation “as for me”, the translation given in (3). 
 
3.4 Combination 
As we saw in (1), the manner in which ideas and their orientations are combined in Seneca is 
very different from their manner of combination in English. To pick just one example from (3), 
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the word da:digwe:gôh in line (f) contains the following (roughly translated) elements in this 
order: “negative” - “masculine plural” - “be all” - “stative aspect”. The English translation “not 
all of them” captures a similar thought, but fails to specify that there are at least three of them (as 
opposed to only two), and that they are males, although in Seneca a masculine prefix is used for 
a mixed group as long as it contains at least one man. The same masculine plural designation 
appears in line (n), referring to the white people who live in Salamanca. 
 In general, however, as noted above, despite the very different ways of combining ideas and 
orientations that are characteristic of a polysynthetic language, such differences need not in 
themselves be a major impediment to translation. Problems arise more conspicuously from 
incompatible categorizations, from different shadow meanings when they are present, and from 
orientations that have no easy equivalences. 
 
4 Translation and memory 
But now it becomes of considerable interest to consider the fact that people do not usually 
remember for very long the specific language they used to express their thoughts. Whereas the 
thoughts themselves may persist in memory for long periods, though perhaps in distorted and 
attenuated form, that is not true of the way they are verbalized on any particular occasion. We 
are left, then, with the following question. Although translations may not capture fully the 
particular categorizations, orientations, and combinations that are used to verbalize thoughts on a 
particular occasion, given that those phenomena are more or less ephemeral, if the translation 
succeeds in approximating them in an even roughly satisfactory way, does this not mean that in 
the end, whatever differences existed between the thoughts of the original and the thoughts 
engendered by the translation tend to fade away, with roughly the same thoughts remaining in 
the minds of the original speaker and the recipient of the translation? Does the answer then not 
depend on how well the translation succeeded in conveying the ideas expressed by the original - 
the ideas themselves, and not the manner in which they happened to be categorized and oriented 
and combined on a particular occasion? 
 To make this question more concrete, would the fact that a bilingual Seneca-English speaker 
heard the Seneca on the left side of (3), or whether such a person heard the English on the right, 
make any difference in the long run? Would he or she remember the ideas that had been 
expressed in essentially the same way? If specific language is ephemeral, to what extent is the 
memory for thoughts affected in the long run by whatever language they happen to have been 
expressed in? 
 I have no final answer to this question, but it is an important one, and I would like to make 
one further suggestion. Introspective and anecdotal evidence suggest that the thoughts conveyed 
by language pass through at least three stages in the minds of language producers and receivers. 
At the first and transitory stage - the moment when language is produced and received and for a 
short time afterward - there is immediate and richly ornamented knowledge of the ideas that 
were expressed and the evaluations associated with them, and also of the ways in which those 
ideas were categorized, oriented, and combined.  
 Within a very short period, however, at least some of those categorizations, orientations, and 
combinations will have faded from memory, whereas the ideas and evaluations will have been 
retained. This is stage two, and it lasts much longer, probably with a gradual degradation in 
memory. It is during this stage that we might say that a translation has been relatively successful, 
because most of the ideas and evaluations that were in the mind of the source language speaker 
have been successfully transmitted through the target language. To be sure, there may still be a 
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residual mismatch, because those categorizations, orientations, and combinations, even after they 
themselves have faded, may have affected the nature of the ideas and evaluations themselves. 
Thus, the Seneca speaker who uttered wáónôhgwáge:eya’s in (1) had explicitly in mind the fact 
that the husband was adversely affected by the death, and that aspect of the idea would not have 
been explicitly communicated by the translation “his wife died”, although anyone might infer 
that a husband would be likely to regret the death of his wife. But if some differences of this sort 
remain in stage two, they will have diminished. The question of the adequacy of translation may 
hinge on this stage, the memory stage, where ideas and evaluations may have been more or less 
successfully transferred across the different languages. 
 But there may be a stage three. If stage two retains the ideas and evaluations of the original 
thoughts, stage three retains only the evaluations. When enough time has passed after thoughts 
have been experienced and transmitted, all that remains may be memory for the emotions or 
attitudes that were at first just one component of those thoughts. People may remember nothing 
more than how they or someone else felt about something, not what that something was. The 
remarks on the Salamanca lease controversy may provide an example. Eventually one might 
remember only that the speaker’s attitude toward the controversy was a charitable one, and that 
he was willing to forget the animosity that had been generated by it. One might be left with 
nothing more than the memory that the speaker was, in that context, a “nice guy”, without 
remembering exactly how one was led to that conclusion. 
 If I am right about this stage three, we are left with another important question. To what 
extent are evaluations, apart from the ideas with which they are associated, affected by language 
differences? Is, for example, the attitude expressed in the Seneca word êgáiwíyoak, literally 
translatable as “the matter will continue to be good”, adequately communicated with the English 
“things will settle down”? Although I can hardly demonstrate it now, it may be that languages 
differ significantly in the ways they express and communicate evaluations, and that this kind of 
difference is in the end the hardest problem for translations to overcome. It may include an 
aesthetic component as well, and the aesthetic dimension is well known as a particularly difficult 
if not unsolvable translation problem. 
 Let me summarize the points I have tried to make. I began with the suggestion that thoughts, 
to the extent that we are conscious of them, have three distinguishable components: ideas, 
evaluations, and inner language. Ideas embrace events and states and their participants, and they 
are located within a multidimensional thought space of time, space, epistemology, social 
interaction, and relations to other ideas. Evaluations include emotions and attitudes. Ideas and 
evaluations may to some extent be organized as inner language before they are overtly 
expressed, although that is not always the case. For thoughts to be fully verbalized, they must be 
adjusted to language in four distinct ways, which I termed selection, categorization, orientation, 
and combination. For each of the four I gave brief examples of differences between the Seneca 
and English languages, each difference potentially a source of distortion in translation. I 
suggested that the most significant distortions may arise because of differences in categorization 
and orientation. I then speculated on whether the ephemeral nature of specific choices of 
linguistic expression may in the long run leave the recipient of a translation with a closer 
approximation to the thoughts that were originally expressed, since the specific language will 
have faded. More speculative still is the possibility that memory sometimes retains nothing more 
than the evaluative component of the original thoughts, so that we are left with the question of 
how effective translations can be in capturing emotions, attitudes, and beauty as well. 
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